The quantum computer isn't here yet, but the cryptography crisis has already begun

For years, quantum computing has been portrayed as a distant, almost theoretical promise, better suited for laboratories than for companies. Today, however, the tone is changing: according to experts cited by Tinexta InfoCert, there is a horizon of three to five years in which quantum computers could put serious pressure on the cryptographic algorithms that protect much of modern digital security.

The decisive point is that we don't need to wait for "day zero" to have a problem. The threat has already started now because of a scenario known as harvest now, decrypt later: hostile actors can intercept encrypted data today, store it, and wait for the moment when quantum power makes it possible to decrypt it in the future.

This completely changes the perspective. We are not just talking about protecting tomorrow's communications, but about defending the value of today's data, especially those that must remain confidential for many years: financial information, health records, intellectual property, digital identities, and institutional communications.

The reason why the issue is so delicate is simple: the infrastructure of trust on the Internet still largely relies on asymmetric cryptography and historical algorithms like RSA and ECC, used for websites, digital signatures, authentication, banking applications, and secure key exchange. If a sufficiently powerful quantum computer were to actually become capable of breaking these schemes, the problem would not affect a technical niche, but the entire operational framework on which the digital economy is based.

The good news is that the technical response is no longer theoretical. In August 2024, NIST finalized the first three primary post-quantum cryptography standards—namely FIPS 203, FIPS 204, and FIPS 205—based respectively on ML-KEM, ML-DSA, and SLH-DSA, designed specifically to resist attacks from future quantum computers. In other words, the question is no longer whether alternative algorithms exist, but how quickly organizations, governments, and providers will be able to migrate to them in an orderly fashion.

And this is where the truly uncomfortable part arrives. Replacing encryption doesn't mean updating a single library or performing a patch over a weekend. It means touching browsers, devices, firmware, legacy systems, smart cards, PKIs, interoperability standards, signature workflows, enterprise tools, and digital supply chains that must continue to operate without interruption. This is why the issue is urgent now: the complexity of migration is such that, even if the full risk materializes years from now, to be ready, the work must start immediately.

International roadmaps are moving exactly in this direction. NIST has invited organizations to begin the transition to quantum-resistant schemes immediately, and public guidelines on migration point toward a progressive phasing out of vulnerable algorithms until a full transition is achieved by 2035 in many institutional contexts. This confirms one important thing: post-quantum is no longer an advanced research exercise, but an infrastructure transformation program that has already begun.

The first sectors called to take action will inevitably be those where data has a long life and systemic impact. Finance, defense, healthcare, digital identity, and trust services are the natural candidates to lead the migration, precisely because they safeguard information that cannot afford to be compromised in five or ten years. But thinking that the problem only concerns these worlds would be a mistake: every company that stores sensitive data or signs digital documents depends, directly or indirectly, on the strength of the encryption it uses today.

For founders, CTOs, and teams building digital products, the message is very clear. The real priority is not "becoming an expert in quantum computing," but becoming crypto-agile—that is, capable of mapping where cryptography is used, understanding which assets have a long confidentiality horizon, and preparing systems that can change algorithms without having to be rewritten from scratch. Those who start now will have time to test, migrate in phases, and manage compatibility and costs; those who wait too long risk turning a scannable transition into an operational emergency.

In this sense, the truly dangerous quantum computer may not be the starting point of the crisis, but its arrival point. When it is ready, the game may have already been decided for years: the advantage will belong to those who started moving first, not to those who were the first to understand that the risk was real.